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Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1999 Term
by RICHARD G. WILKINS,* SCOTT WORTHINGTON,~ RACHELLE
FLEMING, MATTHEW FLEMING, CARTER CHOW
I. Introduction
This Study, the fifteenth in a series,1 tabulates and analyzes the
voting behavior of the United States Supreme Court during the 1999
Term. The analysis is designed to determine whether individual
Justices and the Court as a whole are voting more "conservatively,"
more "liberally," or about the same as compared with past Terms. As
in politics, whether a judicial trend is "conservative" or "liberal"
often lies in the eye of the beholder. A lawyer for the American Civil
Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.
J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 1999. Associate,
Robinson, Seiler & Glazier.
"" J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2001. Associate, Stoel
Rives LLP.
.... J D., J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2001. Associate, Stoel
Rives LLP.
..... J D. Candidate, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2002.
1. Professor Robert E. Riggs began this study with Supreme Court Voting Behavior:
1986 Term, 2 BYU J. PUB. L. 15 (1988). Professor Richard G. Wilkins continued the study
in Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1991 Term, 7 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter
1991 Study]. The last six studies, analyzing the 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998
Terms, were published in the HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY. See
Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 269 (1995) [hereinafter 1993 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme
Court Voting Behavior: 1994 Term, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1995) [hereinafter 1994
Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1995 Term, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins, et al.,
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35 (1997)
[hereinafter 1996 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1997
Term, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 533 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Study]; Richard G. Wilkins
et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1998 Term, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 423 (2000)
[hereinafter 1998 Study].
2. The 1999 Term covers decisions made from October 1999 to July 2000.
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Liberties Union could well paint an ideological picture of the Court
far different from one sketched by a lawyer for Americans United
For Life.
This Study attempts to remove this subjectivity by applying the
following consistent classification scheme to ten categories of cases
across time: "conservative" votes are those that favor an assertion of
governmental power, while "liberal" votes are those that favor a
claim of individual liberty.' By tracking the Term-to-Term
conservative or liberal changes in the voting patterns of individual
Justices and the Court as a whole across these categories of cases,
and by applying standard statistical tests to the resulting data,5 this
Study attempts tq provide reliable information regarding the current
ideological posture of the Court and its members, as well as
conclusions and predictions regarding its past and future trends.
Whether any statistical study of a process as complex as judicial
decision-making can be reliable is, of course, open to debate.6 But,
within the limitations inherent in an attempt to "number crunch"
ideology, this annual survey offers students and practitioners
information useful for assessing how the Court or an individual
Justice will vote in particular types of cases.
This Term's survey shows mixed results, but suggests an overall
conservative voting trend in most categories. Majority decisions in six
of the ten categories (Civil/State Party, Criminal/State Party, First
Amendment, Statutory Civil Rights, Federalism, and Swing Vote)
indicate varying degrees of conservative movement. For example, the
voting results from the Statutory Civil Rights category reveal a
marked decline in the Court's support of such claims. Also,
Civil/State Party decisions-one of the Study's most reliable
categories for ideological manifestations of voting behavior 7-show
3. There is no single, settled definition of conservatism or liberalism. See generally
M.A. RIFE, DICTIONARY OF MODERN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 67-73, 141-52 (1987)
(discussing various possible interpretations of the terms). This Study's definitions,
however, are close to the core ideals of each ideology. See id. at 67 (noting that
conservatism "implies fear of sudden and violent changes, respect for established
institutions and rulers, support for elites and hierarchies, and a general mistrust of theory
as opposed to empirical deductions"); see also id. at 142 (asserting that "twentieth-
century" liberalism is "compounded of constitutionalism; doubtful of pluralism; certain[ ]
of a belief in the virtues of economic freedom, and less certain[ ] of a desire to restrict
government intervention in most other aspects of life").
4. See infra Data Tables 1-10.
5. See infra Appendix B.
6. See infra note 32.
7. See infra Part V.
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solid conservative movement in "Majority," "Split," and
"Unanimous" decisions.8 Finally, the statistics from the Swing Vote
category indicate that in close, ideologically charged cases the Court
voted conservatively 61.5% of the time, reversing the liberal
inclination of the previous two Terms.'
Of the four categories that showed liberal movement, only two
are particularly noteworthy: Civil/Federal Party and Criminal/Federal
Party. In the 1999 Term, the Court decreased its support of the
federal government in both civil and criminal cases, recording its
second lowest score since 1990 in criminal cases. The liberal
movement in the other two categories (Equal Protection and Federal
Jurisdiction) should be viewed with caution. The result in the Equal
Protection category, which showed a significant liberal increase, is
undermined by the fact that the Court decided only one Equal
Protection case this Term. Furthermore, while the Court exercised
federal jurisdiction over claims more often this Term than in any
other Term since the inception of this Study, this category ranks last
in terms of its reliability as an indicator of liberal and conservative
ideology." Therefore, these liberal results may not be as indicative of
a Court-wide trend as the trends identified in other categories.
Last Term's predictive statistics had mixed success in forecasting
this Term's actual voting patterns. The Study most accurately
predicted results for civil cases involving a state government party,
with an average error of only about 4.95 percentage points per
Justice." The least accurate predictions were in the Jurisdiction
category, with an average error of 27.1 points per Justice.2 This is
quite different from last Term, when cases involving questions of
jurisdiction were the most predictable. With respect to individual
Justices, last Term's predicted scores were most accurate for Justice
Ginsburg, with an average error of only 8.56 percentage points.
Oddly, Justice Ginsburg was the most difficult to predict in the
preceding Term. Conversely, the least accurate predictions were for
Justice Stevens, with an average error of 24.0 percentage points, and
8. See infra Data Table 1.
9. See infra Data Table 10.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Data Table 1.
12. See infra Data Table 8. This excludes the Equal Protection category, which,
because of the lack of cases dealing with equal protection issues, has an unusually high
degree of volatility among the Justices' individual voting patterns, which in turn results in
unusually inaccurate predictions.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Justice Thomas, deviating on average by 23.9 points. The small
sample of cases in the Equal Protection and First Amendment
categories in this and last Term accounted for a significant portion of
the prediction error for most of the Justices.
The "Category" analysis, introduced in the 1996 Study and
included in the Study again this Term, indicates that the categories of
Criminal/Federal Party, 3 Civil/State Party, 4 Civil/Federal Party,5
Criminal/State Party,16 and First Amendment 7 are the best indicators,
in that order, of the liberal/conservative predilections among the
Justices. The remaining categories-Statutory Civil Rights, 8
Federalism, 9 Equal Protection,' Jurisdiction, 1 and Swing Votes, -
are relatively poor indicators of the Justices' voting propensities. 3
Frontier analysis this Term held few surprises, with the Chief
Justice and Justice Stevens retaining their customary positions as the
most conservative and liberal Justices respectively.' Perhaps the most
surprising result this Term was Justice Thomas's fourth place showing
behind third place Justice O'Connor on the conservative frontier.
This Study is divided into sections to make it more accessible to
the reader. The precise details of the statistical analysis-as can be
gleaned from a glance at the equations (and explanations) in
Appendix B-are hardly the stuff of light cocktail conversations. But
one need not have an advanced degree in mathematics to understand
the general trends that flow from the Study's analysis. Part II gives a
description of the mode of analysis employed by the Study. Part I
follows with a general overview of this Term's findings. Part IV sets
out the Study's numerical tables, graphs, and statistical charts and
discusses-table-by-table and chart-by-chart-the information
contained in them. Parts V and VI describe the methodology (and
outcome) of this year's "Category" and "Frontier" analyses
13. See infra Data Table 4.
14. See infra Data Table 1.
15. See infra Data Table 2.
16. See infra Data Table 3.
17. See infra Data Table 5.
18. See infra Data Table 7.
19. See infra Data Table 9.
20. See infra Data Table 6.
21. See infra Data Table 8.
22. See infra Data Table 10.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Frontier Analysis Tables 1 and 2; Frontier Charts 1 and 2.
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respectively. Appendices A and B detail the definitions and
statistical tests employed by this Study.
H. Mode of Analysis
The Study is based on the tabulation and mathematical analysis
of each Justice's votes in ten categories. Nine of the categories are
based on the nature of the issues addressed (e.g., First Amendment,
equal protection, etc.) or on the character of the parties involved
(e.g., state or federal government litigants).' The tenth category
tabulates the number of times each Justice voted with the majority in
cases decided by a single, or swing, vote.
The first nine categories are designed to detect each Justice's
attitude toward two broad issues underlying most Supreme Court
decisions: protection of individual rights and judicial restraint. The
tabulation of votes in each category reveals, in broad strokes, the
frequency with which individual Justices and the Court as a whole
vote to protect individual rights? or exercise judicial restraint.'
25. The categories are as follows: (1) civil controversies in which a state, or one of its
officials or political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party; (2) civil controversies in
which the federal government, or one of its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private
party; (3) state criminal cases; (4) federal criminal cases; (5) First Amendment issues of
freedom of speech, press, and association; (6) equal protection claims; (7) statutory civil
rights claims; (8) issues of federal court jurisdiction, party standing, justiciability, and
related matters; and (9) federalism cases.
26. Votes implicating individual rights are tabulated in tables reporting the outcome
of state and federal criminal prosecutions (Tables 3 and 4), as well as those detailing the
resolution of claims based on the First Amendment (Table 5), the Equal Protection Clause
(Table 6), and civil rights statutes (Table 7). The civil cases examined in Tables 1 and 2
also involve individual rights, as these suits pit the government against persons asserting
private rights. The federalism decisions tabulated in Table 9 are less obviously relevant to
individual rights because such decisions focus on the balance of federal and state
authority. Nevertheless, in such cases, the practical effect of voting for the state is to deny
federal relief to a party alleging state encroachment upon his or her rights.
27. Jurisdictional questions (Table 8), which exhibit the relative propensity of the
Justices to avoid judicial decisions, are perhaps the most direct statistical evidence of
judicial restraint. Other Tables included in the Study, however, also provide some
indication of the individual Justices' (and the Court's) positions on the "judicial
restraint/judicial activism" axis. Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to
the policy-making branches of government, adherence to precedent, avoidance of
constitutional bases of decision when narrower grounds exist, respect for the Framers'
intent when construing constitutional text, and avoidance of issues rendered unnecessary
by the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political questions, etc. As a result, a vote in favor
of individual rights claims (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) may provide some indication of "judicial
activism" because judicial recognition of individual rights often requires the Court to
overturn precedent or invalidate an existing statute. Federalism issues (Table 9) are also
relevant because judicial restraint is traditionally identified with respect for the role of the
states within the federal system.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
From the voting patterns that emerge, the Study determines
whether individual Justices and the Court are taking "conservative"
or "liberal" positions. The Study classifies outcomes that favor an
assertion of governmental power as conservative, and outcomes that
favor a claim of individual right as liberal. Accordingly, the Study
classifies as conservative a vote for the government against an
individual, a vote against a claim of constitutional or statutory rights,
a vote against the exercise of jurisdiction, or a vote favoring state (as
opposed to federal) authority on federalism questions. The Study
classifies ali contrary votes as liberal.
This analytical scheme is not perfect. Unanimous decisions (a
significant portion of all cases decided by the Court) are included in
the Study's calculations even though liberal or conservative ideology
may not have influenced the outcome of such cases. Unanimous
opinions often result when either the law or the facts, or both, point
so clearly in one direction that ideology is not a decisional factor.
Furthermore, concern for individual rights is not always, or even
necessarily, the attitudinal opposite of judicial restraint.
Despite these difficulties with our classification scheme, the basic
assumption that supports this Study-that the general orientation of
individual Justices and the Court to individual rights and judicial
restraint is suggestive of conservative or liberal ideology-appears
sound.' For example, deference to legislatures frequently results in
rejection of an individual's claim, especially one predicated upon the
impropriety of governmental action.29 Judicial restraint is associated
with a reluctance to read new rights into the Constitution or a
statute.0 Refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction leaves the matter to
state courts with their possible bias in favor of state governmental
action and is a clear rebuff to the claimant seeking federal protection
of rights.3 Therefore, to the extent the Study's basic ideological
assumptions regarding liberal and conservative outcomes are
accurate, it is possible to identify trends by tracking the voting
patterns reflected in Data Tables 1 through 10.
28. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also category analysis discussion infra
part V.
29. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201(o), does not grant employees the right to prevent
the county from compelling the use of compensatory time).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of L, 522 U.S. 470,478 (1998) (holding that claim
preclusion by reason of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no
ground for removal of state law claims based on federal question jurisdiction).
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To reckon current ideological positions within the Court, votes of
the individual Justices can be compared with those cast by other
Justices this Term, as well as with the outcomes for the 1990 through
1998 Terms. Likewise, the current ideological position of the Court
as a whole can be determined by comparing present outcomes for the
Court majority with those of prior Terms. In Data Tables 1-10, this
information appears in the form of voting percentages for each
Justice and for the Court majority. Charts 1-10, in turn, graphically
depict the Court's voting trends revealed in the tables.
Mean Tables 1-10 and Regression Tables 1-10 analyze the voting
patterns of the individual Justices. The purpose of these tables is to
determine whether a Justice's 1999 Term voting record departs in a
statistically significant manner from his or her prior voting pattern
and whether any significant correlation exists among the Term-to-
Term voting patterns of the Justices.32
Finally, Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4 and Frontier Charts 1-4
compare the Justice's conservative and liberal predilections this Term
and over the course of the entire Study. Frontier analysis33 mitigates
some of the analytical difficulties previously discussed by measuring
the strength of each Justice's tendencies relative to the rest of the
Court with respect to the cases actually presented in a given Term
rather than against any absolute scale.
All of these data and statistics must be interpreted with caution.
The percentages and statistical results revealed on each table are
affected not only by the dispositions of the individual Justices but also
by the nature of the cases decided each Term. Furthermore, Supreme
Court cases are not the result of random selection, and the universe
of votes cast by the Justices is relatively small. Since both random
sampling and large sample size are crucial elements of any fully
reliable statistical analysis, conclusions drawn from this Study are not
beyond dispute. There are obvious limitations to any empirical
analysis of a subjective decision making process.'
32. See infra Appendix B.
33. See id.
34. The general reliability of statistical inference depends on random sampling. See
generally ALLEN T. CRAIG & ROBERT V. HOGG, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL
STATISTICS 157-58 (1995); RAYMOND H. MYERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN
REGRESSION wrrH APPLICATIONS 9-11 (1990). The Court's method of selecting cases is
far from random. Rather, it is the result of a conscious decisional process. Reliable
statistics generally require large quantities of information to produce reliable results. As
sample sizes become larger, inferences become more accurate. This Study is subject to
sampling bias, both because the sample is not random and because it is comparatively
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
In light of these caveats, one might ask whether this Study is
worth either conducting or reading. We believe it is. For years,
experienced Supreme Court practitioners have attempted to divine
the ideological predilections of individual Justices in framing their
arguments to the Court. Moreover, both the media and academicians
are fond of attaching ideological labels to the Court and its personnel.
Supreme Court practitioners, legal scholars and the public have long
assumed that assessments of Court ideology are valuable-even
though such assessments may be based upon little more than the gut
reactions of the attorneys, scholars, and news reporters involved.
This Study, based upon a systematic methodology for objectively
gathering, quantifying and analyzing data over time, should be more
reliable than such ad hoc assessments.
HI. Overview of the Ideological Trends of the 1999 Term
This Term's survey suggests a reversal of the Court's liberal
trend over the past two Terms, with conservative movement in six of
the ten categories. Specifically, the Court's support of statutory civil
rights claims plummeted to an all time low, while the Court exhibited
a dramatic conservative shift in cases decided by one vote.
Furthermore, the Study's second most reliable category for indicating
liberal/conservative trends, Civil/State Party, showed solid
conservative movement in all types of decisions. Yet, this apparent
conservative movement is counter balanced somewhat by the fact that
the Study's most reliable category for indicating conservative/liberal
trends, Criminal/Federal Party, demonstrated some liberal
movement. An overview of the results in each individual category
follows. A more in-depth analysis for each category is set forth in
Part IV of this Study.
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
This Term, the Court's decisions involving a state government
party in a civil action indicated a conservative trend in favor of the
state government in "Majority," "Split" (i.e., non-unanimous) and
"Unanimous" decisions. While Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stevens maintained the highest rank and lowest rank, respectively,
Justice Thomas moved in rank considerably, voting surprisingly less
often in favor of state governments. The statistical voting predictions
small. The statistical inferences below, therefore, may not accurately represent a Justice's
(or the Court's) views.
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for the 1999 Term were generally quite accurate in this category.
Justices Ginsburg and Stevens have a strong voting correlation of 0.97
and a high R2 statistic35 of 0.93 (hereinafter correlation and W7 will be
noted consecutively as correlation/R 2 -e.g., 0.97/0.93), making these
two the most likely members of the Court to vote together when a
state government is party in a civil case. A high W7 statistic indicates
that one of the two Justices' score may be predicted with a high
degree of accuracy based on the score of the other. Correlation does
not, however, imply causation.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party.
The Court showed slight liberal movement during the 1999 Term
in its treatment of the federal government in civil cases, finding
against the government more often in "Split" decisions and for the
government only 50% of the time in "Majority" decisions. All but
two Justices showed decreased support for the federal government
compared to last Term. Of particular interest in this category was the
unusual voting behavior of traditionally liberal Justice Breyer. Justice
Breyer voted for the federal government 70% of the time, tying the
Chief Justice as the Justice most supportive of the federal
government.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private
Party.
The data in this category reveal a conservative trend, as the
Court increased its support of state governments over last Term.
Every Justice, except for Justice Souter, voted for the states more
often this Term than in the 1998 Term. Furthermore, the Court
favored the states more often in "Majority" and "Unanimous"
decisions. However, the Court's support of the states in "Split"
decisions dropped by 15 percentage points this Term from the 1998
Term, somewhat buffering the otherwise conservative movement in
this category. Despite this decline, the Court nonetheless favored
state governments most of the time this Term in "Split" decisions. As
usual, this category exhibited rather polarized voting, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist on the conservative end of the spectrum-
recording a score of 87%, and Justices Stevens and Souter on the
liberal end-each with a score of 27.3%.
35. The R2 statistic is an estimate of -2, the true measure of correlation between the
dependant variable and its independent counterpart(s).
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Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party.
The liberal trend detected in this category by the 1998 Term
statistics has continued. Support of the federal government in the
"Majority" and "Unanimous" categories decreased for the fourth
year in a row. In fact, the Court has only recorded a lower score in
the "Majority" category one time in the last ten years. But, despite
this liberal trend, most of the cases were still decided in favor of the
government.
Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Religion.
Unlike the past two Terms, the Court decided more than just a
couple of cases involving First Amendment issues in the 1999 Term.
While this increase in First Amendment claims provides insight into
the Court's current stance on such claims, the lack of First
Amendment claims in the prior two Terms makes it difficult to
identify trends in voting with any certainty. That said, the majority of
the Court voted in favor of the claim only 44.4% of the time in the
1999 Term, a 55 percentage point drop from last Term. The Court's
support of First Amendment claims in "Split" and "Unanimous"
decisions dropped dramatically as well. Thus, voting in this category
exhibited a conservative trend.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
The Supreme Court addressed only one Equal Protection issue
this Term and decided the single issue in favor of the claim. This lone
data point makes it impossible to identify trends or positions with any
certainty. Furthermore, because the Court reached a unanimous
decision on the single Equal Protection issue addressed this Term,
statistics regarding the individual Justices, voting correlation, and
predictions are inconclusive.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims.
The Court's liberal trend of increased support of statutory civil
rights, present in the last four Terms, ended this Term with the Court
deciding significantly less often in favor of the claim in "Majority,"
"Split," and "Unanimous" decisions. Additionally, with the
exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, each
Justice voted less often in favor of the claim, and thus more
conservatively, than predicted. Mean Table 7 indicates that this
W~ol. 28:
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Term's voting record shows a statistically significant change in voting
for five of the nine Justices. In regards to the accuracy of last year's
predictions, the Court's unexpected conservative leanings this Term
resulted in predictions that were generally too liberal.
Data Table 8: Federal Jurisdiction Claims.
There was a sharp decrease in the number of cases involving
issues of federal jurisdiction this Term (6) compared to last Term
(20). The Court accepted 83.3% of all claims in favor of federal
jurisdiction in the 1999 Term. The Court also showed liberal
movement by voting for federal jurisdiction 66.7% of the time in
"Split" decisions and for federal jurisdiction 100% of the time in
"Unanimous" decisions. Each individual Justice voted in favor of
federal jurisdiction more often than ever before and all of the Justices
except Justice Breyer evidenced a statistically significant change in
voting behavior. Interestingly, Justice Breyer tied generally
conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in voting for
federal jurisdiction the least number of times.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
This Term's voting reveals a slight conservative movement in this
category as the Court increased its support of states' rights in each
type of decision-"Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous." However,
despite such broad increase, the Court nonetheless found for the state
less than half of the time in this category during the 1999 Term. Any
conservative movement on this Table, therefore, is moderate at best.
Data Table 10: Swing Vote Cases.
The Court reached a conservative outcome much more often this
Term than in the 1998 Term in cases decided by one vote, evidencing
a reversal of the liberal trend over the past two Terms. Sixty-one
percent of swing vote decisions resulted in a conservative outcome.
Perhaps the most notable result revealed by the statistics in this
category is the increased polarization of the Court. Specifically, a 38-
percentage point difference separates the traditionally conservative
and liberal camps.
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IV. Analysis
Data Table 1: Civil Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
The Court's decisions this Term involving state governments in
civil suits indicate a conservative trend in favor of the state
governments in "Majority," "Split," and "Unanimous" decisions.'
Last year we noted a slight conservative sentiment apparent in the
non-unanimous or "Split" decisions.37 This sentiment appears to have
increased considerably as the Court voted for the state government
party 55.6% in "Majority" decisions, 58.3% in "Split" decisions, and
50% in "Unanimous" decisions compared to last Term's votes in
favor of the government of 44.8%, 47.1%, and 41.7%, respectively.
Regarding the individual results, Chief Justice Rehnquist
maintained his position as the Justice most often voting in favor of the
state-party-a position the Chief Justice has held for the past four
Terms. Justice Stevens likewise maintained the rank he has held
repeatedly, the position of voting least often for the state government
party. Interestingly, Justice Thomas, typically among the top two
most conservative voters in the civil state government party category,
fell in rank-tying for fourth with Scalia and Souter. As indicated by
Mean Table 1, this Term's voting record demonstrated a statistically
significant change in voting behavior for Justices Kennedy, Scalia,
Stevens, and Thomas. But, while Justices Kennedy and Scalia both
voted less often in favor of the state government, neither Justice
moved significantly in rank. And, although Justice Stevens
maintained his rank as most liberal, he voted significantly more often
in favor of the state government party than he has in the past-voting
more often in favor of the state government in only two other Terms
the last 10 years.'
36. Cases decided in favor of state governments: Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576 (2000); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000);
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377
(2000); Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000); L.A. Police Dep't v. United
Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999) (missing 2). Cases decided against state
governments: Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Bd. of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal., 528 U.S. 458 (2000); Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Vill. of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
37. See 1998 Study, supra note 1.
38. Stevens voted conservatively in 1996 and 1994.
[Vol. 28:
Spring 2001] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1999 TERM 595
Regression Table 1, setting forth the voting correlations between
the individual Justices, provides a couple of notable voting
correlations. First, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens have a very strong
voting correlation and R2 statistic of 0.97/0.93, making the two the
most likely to vote together when a state government is party in a
civil case. Also with strong voting correlation are: Justices Breyer
and Souter, and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Interestingly, the
Chief Justice and Justice Breyer also have a relatively strong voting
correlation of 0.90/0.76.
The statistical voting predictions for the 1999 Term were
generally very accurate in the Civil/State Party category. For
example, the Majority voted in favor of the state party in 50% of the
decisions reached, while the 1999 prediction was 48.1%, resulting in a
rather small error of 1.9 points. The predictions made for individual
Justices were also quite accurate, with the exception of the
predictions made for Justice Thomas and Justice Stevens.
Data Table 2: Civil Cases - Federal Government versus a Private Party.
The voting results this Term suggest slight liberal movement on
the High Court in the Civil/Federal Party category. While
percentages in "Unanimous" decision cases stayed the same as last
Term, the Court's support of the federal government in civil cases
decreased in both "Majority" and "Split" decisions.39 Seven of the
nine Justices voted less often for the federal government than they
did last Term. However, the individual scores of all the Justices
except Justice Thomas remained at or above 50%.
The most notable statistic among the individual Justices' voting
records is that historically liberal Justice Breyer tied Justice
Rehnquist for the most conservative voting spot. Both Justices were
supportive of the federal government in 70% of the cases this Term.'
Conversely, normally conservative Justice Thomas was the least
supportive of the federal government, voting in favor of the
39. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Baral v. United States, 528 U.S.
431 (2000); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Public
Lands Council v. Babbit, 529 U.S. 728 (2000); Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care,
Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000); Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999). Cases decided against
the federal government: Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000); Mobil
Oil Exploration v. United States, 530 U.S. 604 (2000); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
529 U.S. 803 (2000).
40. See supra Data Table 2.
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government only 40% of the time.4 1  With regard to statistically
significant changes in voting behavior, Justice Kennedy was more
liberal this Term than in the past, and Justice Souter was more
conservative than usual.42
Regression Table 2 shows an interestingly strong correlation in
voting behavior between Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg,
3
generally two ideologically opposed Justices. Justice Kennedy proved
to be the most predictable Justice in this category of cases as his score
of 50% was only 2 percentage points from his predicted score.
Overall, predicted scores for the Justices were much closer to their
actual scores this Term than last Term.
Data Table 3: Criminal Cases - State Government versus a Private Party.
Data Table 3 exhibits an increase in the Court's support of the
states in criminal cases."4 The Court voted more often for the state in
the 1999 Term in both "Majority" and "Unanimous" decisions than
last Term, indicating a slight conservative trend. While the Court's
support of state governments in "Split" decisions decreased by fifteen
percentage points this Term, it still scored a rather conservative
62.5%. The existence of a slight conservative trend is further
bolstered by the fact all of the Justices, except for Justice Souter,
favored the state more often this Term than in the 1998 Term.45
Additionally, with the exception of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Stevens, the Justices' increased support of the states was statistically
significant.46 Data Table 3 also reveals that the Court is becoming
increasingly polarized in Criminal/State Party cases; over thirty-seven
points separated the "liberal" and "conservative" groups. The
polarization in the category has been increasing since the 1996 Term.
41. id.
42. Id.
43. See supra Regression Table 2.
44. Cases decided in favor of the states: Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000);
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000); fllinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Martinez v.
Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152 (2000); Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000); New
York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000); Portoundo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000), Ramdass v.
Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Smith v. Robins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); Weeks v. Angelone,
528 U.S. 225 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Cases decided against the
states: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000);
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999).
45. See supra Data Table 3.
46. See supra Mean Table 3.
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The ordering of the Justices was fairly consistent within their
respective ideological ranks. Chief Justice Rehnquist recorded the
highest score in this category, finding for the states 87% of the time.
By doing so, he dethroned Justice Thomas as the most conservative
Justice in this category. Prior to this Term, Justice Thomas had
recorded the highest score in this category every Term since 1992
when, not surprisingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist scored the highest.
The Chief Justice was followed this Term by Justices Thomas and
Scalia, who each voted for the states 82.6% of the time. On the
liberal end of the spectrum, Justices Souter and Stevens tied with a
score of 27.3%. This was a marked increase for Justice Stevens, who
voted in favor of the states in only 9% of issues last Term.
With a few exceptions, this Term's predictions were relatively
accurate. The predictions for six of the nine Justices were within ten
points of their actual scores. However, Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy favored the government 16.7 percentage points more often
this Term than was predicted. Given the rather neutral nature of
their past voting in this category, such a large error should come as no
surprise. Indeed, their score of 78.3% was a personal high for both
Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy. The prediction for
"Majority" decisions was quite accurate, deviating only 0.4 points
from the actual score.
Data Table 4: Criminal Cases - Federal Government versus a Private
Party.
For the third time in three years, the Court's support for the
federal government in criminal cases decreased in the 1999 Term. 7
Although the Justices' scores show only a slight liberal movement,
this movement appears to be a real shift in voting behavior. It should
be noted, however, that a "strict" reading of criminal statutes leads to
a liberal outcome.' This could be the reason for the liberal
47. Cases decided in favor of the federal government: Carter v. United States, 530
U.S. 255 (2000); Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000); Johnson v. United States,
529 U.S. 694 (2000); Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000); United States v. Johnson,
529 U.S. 53 (2000); United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000). Cases decided
against the federal government: Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Castillo v.
United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Jones
v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); United States v. Hubble, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000) (strict reading of 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(b) caused Justices Scalia and Thomas to find that the defendant had not received
"benefits" within the meaning of the statute and had, therefore, done nothing to defraud a
health care provider); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (strict reading of 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) caused Justice Scalia to find that the defendant had not violated
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movement of the Court over the last few years. Close adherence to
statutory text, generally speaking, is a conservative judicial stance. 9
Thus, the "liberal" movement on this Table could be explained as the
result of ideologically conservative Justices reading statutory texts
narrowly, thereby favoring the criminal defendants.'
The Court held for the federal government only 54.5% of the
time. The Court has only recorded a lower score in "Majority"
decisions once in the last ten Terms. Furthermore, the 50% score for
the "Unanimous" category matches the all-time low score the Court
received in the 1994 Term. In "Split" decision cases, the Court
decided for the federal government in only five of the nine cases.5
Although every Justice, except Justice Scalia, showed a
statistically significant change in voting behavior,52 the normal
conservative to liberal ordering of the Justices remained true to
form 3 The Court's liberal trend is illuminated in the Justices'
individual voting scores. All but Justice Scalia voted less often for the
federal government than last Term, and those scores were the lowest
in four years for the individual Justices." Justice Scalia's score was his
second lowest score in the same four-year period
51
As with last Term, the strongest correlation in voting behavior
was between Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg. This pair recorded
a relatively high correlation and R2 score of 0.95/0.89.56
Statistically predicted voting patterns for the 1999 Term were
much too conservative, both for the Court and for individual Justices.
Justice Thomas displayed the most predictable voting behavior; his
score of 54.6% was only two percentage points from his predicted
score. Justice Ginsburg showed similarly predictable voting behavior
with a deviation of only 2.6 points from her predicted score. Justice
Stevens, who usually varies in this category, was the least predictable
Justice with a prediction error of 28 points.
conditions of his supervised release).
49. See text accompanying note 29.
50. See supra note 46.
51. See supra Data Table 4.
52. See supra Mean Table 4.
53. See supra Data Table 4.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See supra Regression Table 4.
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Data Table 5: First Amendment Rights of Expression, Association, and
Religion.
Table 5 demonstrates a sharp decline in the Court's support of
First Amendment claims in the 1999 Term.' Support for such claims
fell in both "Majority" and "Split" decisions: from 100% last Term to
44.4% for "Majority" decisions and from 100% last Term to 50% this
Term for "Split" decisions. However, it is difficult to conclude that
this decrease in support of First Amendment claims indicates a trend,
as only a couple of First Amendment cases were decided in each of
the preceding two Terms.
The conservative/liberal ordering of the Justices in this category
was very unusual this Term.5 8  For example, Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, and Scalia recorded the three most liberal scores, scoring
77.8%, 66.7%, and 56.6%, respectively. In contrast, Justices Breyer,
Souter, and Ginsburg recorded the three most conservative scores,
scoring 12.5%, 28.6%, and 33.3%, respectively. Further illustrating
the strange ordering of this category, Justices Stevens and Rehnquist,
two rather ideologically opposed Justices, were next to each other in
the middle of the pack. Only the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens
and Souter exhibited a statistically significant change in their voting
behavior."'
The unusual ordering of the Justices in this category may result
from many of the Justices voting in a manner opposite to their
respective historical patterns (i.e., traditionally conservative Justices
voting in favor of the claim and traditionally liberal Justices voting
against the claim).' In many instances, the Justices did so in response
to the underlying subject matter of the First Amendment claim. For
example, the First Amendment issues in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale6' and Hill v. Colorado6 were homosexual and abortion rights,
57. See supra Data Table 5. Cases decided in favor of the First Amendment claim:
Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640(2000); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); United States v. Playboy
Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000); L.A. Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp.,
528 U.S. 32 (1999). Cases decided against the First Amendment claim: Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
58. See supra Data Table 5.
59. See supra Mean Table 5.
60. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Cal. Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Nixon v. Shrink Mo., 528
U.S. 377 (2000).
61. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
62. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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respectively. In both cases, a vote in favor of the First Amendment
claim was, in essence, a vote against these claimed rights.63 Thus,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer (typical supporters of
homosexual and abortion rights) voted against the claims in both
cases, while the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy voted for the claim. In short, the First Amendment
category in the 1999 Term was dominated by the Justices' ideological
attitudes toward the subject matter of the underlying claim.
Ideology also pervaded the voting correlation among the
Justices. For example, the voting of ideologically similar Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg exhibited a relatively strong correlation of
0.97/0.93, while the voting of Justices Thomas and Scalia exhibited the
same high degree of correlation, 0.97/0.93."
In summary, the lack of cases involving First Amendment claims
in the past few Terms, coupled with the apparent impact of subject
matter ideology on First Amendment claims this Term, make it
difficult to gauge the Justices' attitude toward First Amendment
claims and, thereby, draw any conclusions regarding trends in the
voting behavior of the Court.
Data Table 6: Equal Protection Claims.
During the 1999 Term, the Supreme Court decided only one case
involving an equal protection issue.65 Consequently, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to identify trends or positions with any certainty. In
the past three Terms, the Court has addressed a total of only four
equal protection issues-one in 1998 and two in 1997. In both the
1997 and 1998 Term studies, we analyzed the limited data in
conjunction with the prior years' results with the hope that combining
the decisions would provide a better indicator of any ideological
trends in this category of decisions. Adding this Term's single
63. For example, in Boy Scouts of America, the Court was confronted Nxith the issue
of whether requiring the Boy Scouts to admit Respondent, an openly homosexual
individual, into a troop as an assistant scoutmaster violated its First Amendment right of
expressive association. Consequently, a vote in favor of the claim essentially curtailed
homosexual rights. Likewise, in Hill, petitioners argued that a Colorado statute limiting
the ability of abortion protestors to approach and speak to people entering health care
facilities where abortions were performed infringed on their First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. Thus, a vote in favor of the First Amendment claim was essentially a
vote to deter abortion.
64. See supra Regression Table 5.
65. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
66. See 1998 Study at 483, supra note 1.
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decision in support of the equal protection claim with the single
decision against the claim in the 1998 Term, and the two decisions in
1997-the majority finding in favor of the claim in one and against the
claim in the other-results in the majority voting in support of the
equal protection claim 50% of the time. This would support the
conclusion asserted last year that "the Court is maintaining its
generally conservative disposition." 67
Because the Court reached a unanimous decision on the single
equal protection issue addressed this Term, statistics regarding the
individual Justices, such as rank, significant change in voting
behavior, and correlation between the Justices, are inconclusive.
Additionally, Data Table 6 indicates that the prediction for
"Majority" decisions this Term was 62.7 points in error, and the
predictions for the individual Justices generally resulted in high
percentage points of error as well. These large errors are a result of
the lack of equal protection cases decided in the previous two Terms
and the single decision addressed this Term.
Data Table 7: Statutory Civil Rights Claims.
The Court's decisions in recent Terms have exhibited a liberal
trend, as the Court has increased its support of statutory civil rights in
each of the past four Terms.8 However, Data Table 7 and Chart 7
indicate that this trend ended this Term since the Court decided only
25% of all issues in favor of the civil rights claim.69 This is the least
support statutory civil rights have received in the fourteen Terms
covered by this Study. The conservative turnabout is also very
apparent in the "Split" decision where ideology may be particularly
relevant. Here, the Court found against the claim 100% of the time.
Additionally, the Court unanimously voted against statutory civil
rights in 50% of all "Unanimous" decisions. Therefore, "Majority,"
"Split," and "Unanimous" decisions all indicate a decrease in support
of statutory civil rights claims and thus, a conservative trend for the
first time in four Terms.
The Statutory Civil Rights Claims category clearly reflects the
typical voting nature of the individual Justices. The Court appears
67. Id.
68. See id. at 484; 1997 Study at 93, supra note 1; 1996 Study at 591, supra note 1.
69. Cases decided in favor of the statutory civil rights claim: Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S.
320 (2000). Cases decided against the statutory civil rights claim: Texas v. Lesage, 528
U.S. 18 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
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split, with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter all voting
liberally in support of the claim on 75% of the issues and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, with Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas voting conservatively, supporting the claim in only 25% of
the cases decided this Term. Because this voting breakdown results
in a four-way tie for most liberal and a five-way tie for most
conservative, the individual ranks of the Justices are not otherwise
noteworthy.
However, changes in voting behavior of the individual Justices
reflected on Mean Table 7 do warrant additional comment. The 1999
Term showed a statistically significant change in voting behavior for
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Breyer, with Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist voting more conservatively than in the past and Justice
Breyer voting more liberally. This voting trend, as with Table 10,
shows the increasing polarization of the Court. Among the Justices,
the only voting correlation worth noting is that between Justice
Souter and Justice Ginsburg of 0.94/0.85.
The Court's unexpected conservative leanings this Term resulted
in predictions that were far too liberal across the board, with the
exceptions of those predictions for characteristically conservative
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. The greatest error-
36.5 points-is found with the prediction for "Majority" decisions. As
mentioned previously, the Majority only supported the claim 25% of
the time, remarkably less often than the predicted 61.5%.
Additionally, our prediction for Justice O'Connor resulted in a high
error of 29 points, with Justice O'Connor voting again less often in
support of the claim than predicted.
Data Table 8: Federal Jurisdiction Claims.
Data Table 8 lists the Justices from the most liberal to the most
conservative based on their voting in the Jurisdiction category. ° Data
Table 8 shows the Court's increased support for federal jurisdiction.?"
For the first time in a decade, the Court showed increased support of
federal jurisdiction over the previous Term in all three categories of
70. See supra Data Table 8.
71. See id. Cases decided in favor of exercising jurisdiction: Adarand v. Slater, 528
U.S. 216 (2000); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000). Case
decided against exercising jurisdiction: Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1 (2000).
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decisions - "Majority," "Spilt," and "Unanimous." Indeed, all three
categories experienced a large shift in liberal voting. All nine Justices
also voted more often for federal jurisdiction this Term than last
Term.' Nevertheless, as each Justice voted for federal jurisdiction in
at least two thirds of the cases, it may be difficult to glean much from
this Term's jurisdiction statistics. Perhaps these statistics do not
reflect the ideology of the Court as much as the nature of the
jurisdiction cases before the Court. However, all of the Justices,
except the traditionally liberal Justice Stevens, show a statistically
significant change in voting behavior.' Thus, this chart tends to
indicate that the Court, as a whole, is voting more liberally in this
category, and that this trend in voting behavior constitutes real
movement in favor of federal jurisdiction.
Regression Table 8 shows that the Justices were very much in
favor of federal jurisdiction this Term. Several pairs of Justices
showed an unusually high correlation and R2 relationship.
Historically liberal Justices Souter and Ginsburg's 0.98/0.96 score was
notably high. A number of other pairs recorded a strong correlation
of 0.95/0.89; these pairs are Justices Scalia and O'Connor, Justices
Ginsburg and Kennedy, and Justices Souter and Kennedy. The
increased number of correlated pairs in this category may be due to
the nature of the jurisdiction cases this Term.
Other than the Equal Protection category, where there was only
one case this Term, the percentage of error for voting predictions was
the highest for federal jurisdiction cases. The voting predictions for
each individual Justice, and consequently for the Court as a whole,
were too conservative. 4 Data Table 8 indicates that the Study's 1999
prediction for "Majority" decisions was 30.5 points in error." The
average percentage of error for each individual Justice was 27.1
points.
Data Table 9: Federalism Cases.
Data Table 9 shows a slight conservative trend in the Court's
treatment of federalism issues.76  For example, in "Majority"
72. See id.
73. See supra Mean Table 8.
74. See supra Data Table 8
75. See id.
76. See supra Data Table 9. Cases decided in favor of the state: Christensen v. Harris
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000); United States v.
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decisions, the Court increased its support of states' rights by 10.7
percentage points over the 1998 Term. Both "Split" and
"Unanimous" decisions in favor of the state also increased this Term.
Yet, despite this apparent trend, the Court nonetheless voted for the
state in less than half of the issues with which it was presented.
Although Justice Thomas decreased his support of states' rights
this Term, he still recorded the most conservative score at 60%.
Chief Justice Rehnquist exhibited a statistically significant change in
voting behavior by decreasing his support for the states by 13.3 points
to a score of 46.7%.' Such a decrease in support dropped him in
conservative/liberal rank to fourth on the list. On the other end of
the spectrum, Justice Breyer recorded the most liberal score in this
category, voting for the state only 13.3% of the time. This was his
lowest score since becoming a member of the Court. He was followed
by Justice Souter, who also decreased his support of states' rights by
recording a score of 20%. Justices Souter and Breyer's move to the
bottom of list resulted in a statistically significant change in the voting
behavior of each Justice.78
The voting behavior of many of the Justices was highly
correlated in this category.79 For example, the correlation between
the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor was 0.92/0.83. The Chief
Justice shared a rather high correlation with Justices Scalia and
Breyer of 0.90/0.78 and 0.90/0.77, respectively. The highest voting
correlation in federalism cases existed between Justices Breyer and
Souter, 0.95/0.88.
With the exception of Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Stevens,
the predictions for the 1999 Term were relatively accurate in this
category.' For example, Justice Kennedy recorded a score of 53.5%,
only 0.2 points less than his predicted score. Similarly, the Chief
Justice's score was within 1.4 points of the prediction. However, a
few predictions were rather inaccurate. Perhaps most notable was the
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765
(2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Cases decided in favor of the federal
government: Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344
(2000); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000);
Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
77. See supra Mean Table 9.
78. See id.
79. See supra Regression Table 9.
80. See supra Mean Table 9.
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18.7 point error in predicting Justice Stevens' score. This large error
resulted from Justice Stevens' surprising 18.7 point increase in
support of states' rights over last Term. Although Justice Ginsburg
was predicted to dramatically decrease her support of states in
federalism cases, she actually increased her support of states' rights,
resulting in the largest error in this category of 24.8 points.
Data Table 10: Swing Vote Cases.
Data Table 10 and Chart 10 contain the voting scores for the
cases this Term that were decided by a margin of one vote.'I Because
of the narrow voting margin, swing-vote cases are perhaps the most
reliable indicator of the Court's position on the conservative/liberal
spectrum. Justices O'Connor and Thomas tied for the Justices that
voted most often with the majority by recording scores of 84.62%
each. This is the second consecutive Term that Justice Kennedy has
not occupied this position-a position he held for the preceding five
Terms. In contrast, Justice Breyer was the least likely to follow the
majority, voting with the majority on only 19.23% of issues this Term.
Justice Breyer exhibited a statistically significant change in voting
behavior to reach this low score, his lowest score since joining the
Court in 1994. Overall, the Court reached a conservative result in
61.5% of swing-vote issues.
Predictions for this Term were generally inaccurate.' The
prediction for Justice Thomas was the only one within less than 15
points of the actual score. Justices Souter and Ginsburg voted much
less often with the majority than was predicted, resulting in an error
of over 30 points for both Justices.
Perhaps the most dramatic result revealed by Data Table 10 is
the increasing polarization of the Court. Justices O'Connor, Thomas,
81. Swing-vote cases reaching a conservative outcome: Carter v. United States, 530
U.S. 255 (2000); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Ohler v.
United States, 529 U.S. 753 (2000); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156 (2000); Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Shalala v. Illinois, 529 U.S. 1 (2000); Smith v.
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259(2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Weeks v.
Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Swing-vote cases
reaching a liberal outcome: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000); Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000); Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000).
82. See supra Data Table 10.
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Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Scalia all voted more often with the
majority this Term than in the 1998 Term. On the other hand,
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer all voted less often
with the majority this Term. Consequently, a pronounced gap of over
thirty-eight points separates the "conservative" and "liberal" groups.
These results, coupled with the Court's 18.6 point increase in the
number of conservative outcomes on swing-vote issues this Term,
indicate a conservative trend in controversial cases. The nature of the
Justices appointed by the new President---conservative or liberal-
could either increase or reverse this conservative trend in close,
ideologically charged cases. Therefore, the selection of George W.
Bush as President of the United States rather than former Vice
President Gore could have a profound effect on the future voting
behavior of the Court.?
83. Interestingly, the Court itself decided the outcome of an election that could have
significant impact on the future voting trends of the Court. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
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V. Category Analysis
Beginning in the 1996 Term, we began to analyze the
effectiveness of this Study's categories in measuring liberal and
conservative tendencies and trends. As might be expected, some
categories turn out to be better indicators than others of the Court's
collective and individual predilections.
Some categories, although tending to divide the Court into
liberal/conservative blocs, may "change polarity" depending on the
specific issues presented. For example, during the 1996 Term, our
First Amendment tally placed Justices Scalia and Thomas at the
top-a liberal position under this Study's definitions, and a position
not commonly occupied by these particular Justices. Conversely,
Justice Breyer held the bottom spot during that Term. These unusual
results seemed to result from other ideological issues implicated in
the decisions.8s Other problems are also encountered. For example, a
small sample within a given category results in highly volatile score
movements from Term to Term because a single case may account for
many percentage points. This point is dramatically illustrated this
Term in the Equal Protection category, with only one case touching
on the issueY Because only one equal protection issue was decided,
and was decided unanimously for the claim, each Justice scored 100%
in the category - an unprecedented result.
In order to determine which categories best differentiate
between the more liberal and more conservative Justices, we have
applied factor analysisY By applying this method, we have
determined that a primary factor may be extracted from the Study's
categories that accounts for over 25% of the variance revealed by the
data on Tables 1 through 9.' We interpret this factor as
liberal/conservative bias because that is what this Study purports to
measure. The categories currently load onto this primary factor as
follows:
84. See 1996 Study at 90-92, supra note 1.
85. See supra Data Table 6.
86. See supra Data Table 6.
87. For more information regarding factor analysis, see Appendix B.
88. We employed a QMAX rotation to achieve this result. See iiifra Appendix B,
Section E.
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Category Factor 1
Criminal/Federal Party 0.726
Civil/State Party 0.701
Civil/Federal Party 0.648
Criminal/State Party 0.622
First Amendment 0.610
Statutory Civil Rights 0.281
Federalism 0.120
Equal Protection -0.034
Jurisdiction 
-0.700
Variance 2.296
% Variance 0.255
According to this ranking, the "Criminal: Federal versus Private
Party" category appears to be our best differentiator of
liberal/conservative leanings, while "Jurisdiction" is our poorest. A
look at the data seems to confirm this result.
Jurisdiction cases have become increasingly rare (only six cases
this Term). Equal protection claims are also rare and produce
volatile results.8'
Interestingly, Civil/Federal Party cases have become steadily
better indicators over the course of this Study. These cases tend to
switch poles as executive administrations change. Liberal
administrations will bring different types of cases before the Court
than will conservative administrations and will garner the support of
different Justices. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's average
score was 74% under Republican administrations, but has fallen to
61% since President Clinton took office. On the other hand, Justice
Stevens averaged 48% under the Republicans and 59% under
President Clinton.9' This category's increasing accuracy as an
indicator each Term may stem from the fact that an increasing
majority of the Terms included in this Study (eight out of twelve now)
have transpired during Democratic administrations.
First Amendment cases also tend toward pole swapping. For
example, if the 1996 Term's free speech issues had concerned flag
burning rather than abortion clinic demonstrations and gay rights, the
scores might have been nearly reversed.9'
89. See supra Chart 6.
90. See id.; see also discussion of Table 2.
91. See 1996 Study, note 1 at 91, supra note 1. Note, however, that because of the
[Vol. 28:
Spring 2001] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR: 1999 TERM 617
In summary, category analysis suggests that the most reliable
indicator of actual ideology is the data collected on Table 4
(Criminal/Federal Party), with Tables 1 (Civil/State Party), 2
(Civil/Federal Party), 3 (Criminal/State Party), and 5 (First
Amendment) providing the next most reliable data. Tables 7
(Statutory Civil Rights), 9 (Federalism), 6 (Equal Protection) and 8
(Jurisdiction) provide the least reliable information.
VI. Frontier Analysis
Attempting to quantify the magnitude of a Justice's liberal or
conservative tendencies and to identify trends in such tendencies over
time is challenging for a variety of reasons. One challenge already
discussed is that of choosing appropriate tests and assessing their
validity. Another is dealing with inconsistency in the nature of cases
appealed to the Court from one Term to the next and the Court's
selection of which questions it will decide. With varying parameters
such as these, is there any meaningful way to quantify, analyze, and
compare the Justices' inclinations? One potentially useful method is
frontier analysis.'
Frontier analysis focuses on the Justices' relative scores rather
than their absolute scores. Boundaries or "frontiers" are defined by
the highest and lowest scores in each category and each combination
of categories. Each Justice is then evaluated relative to the
established frontier. Moreover, by adjusting the relative weights
allocated to each category, the frontier can be adjusted to reflect each
category's effectiveness as determined by factor analysis.
We present liberal and conservative frontier data for the Court
in Frontier Analysis Tables 1-4. Two versions of each frontier are
presented. In Tables 1 and 2, we constrain the weights applied to
each category according to the factor analysis hierarchy described
above.93 In other words, each Justice is allowed to "choose" the
weights that produce the highest frontier score for him or her, subject
to the limitation that Statutory Civil Rights cannot receive more
weight than Criminal/State, Civil/State cannot receive more weight
than Statutory Civil Rights, and so forth. Tables 3 and 4 apply no
weighting constraints at all, allowing each Justice to "choose" those
First Amendment category's small sampling for the last two years, (only three cases for
the 1997 Term and 1998 Term combined), it has not been as indicative of ideological
positions as it has in the past.
92. For more information regarding frontier analysis, see infra Appendix B.
93. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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weights that present him or her in the most conservative or liberal
light possible. Each table lists a "% of Frontier" score for each
Justice. Those with a score of 100% reach the frontier by employing
the category weight distribution shown in the category columns.
Scores of less than 100% indicate that the most conservative/liberal
score the Justice could obtain with optimal weighting places him or
her the indicated percentage of the way toward the frontier. In some
cases, an optimal combination of weights may even place a Justice
beyond the frontier. This condition is known as "superefficiency"
and is noted in the charts when present.
Frontier Charts 1 and 2 show the constrained scores of each
Justice over the course of this Study in graphical form. Near the
bottom of each chart is an indication of new Justices replacing
outgoing Justices on the Court. Although former Justices' scores are
not indicated, they contributed to frontier determination during
Terms in which they sat on the Court.
Frontier Charts 3 and 4 show each Justice's range of frontier
scores during the course of this Study. They are easier to read than
the line graphs and give a clearer picture of the Justices' relative
positions and score ranges overall. They do not, however, show any
trend information.
The Charts reveal several interesting trends. Frontier Chart 1
shows Justice Thomas making a superefficient conservative "splash"
during his first Term on the Court, then settling in around the frontier
thereafter-until this Term where he finished in the middle of the
pack. Frontier Chart 2 continues to show clear and growing
domination of the liberal frontier by Justice Stevens. 9'
Frontier Chart 3 shows that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas have all reached the
conservative frontier at some point during the Study. In fact, the
Chief Justice has demonstrated conservative super-efficiency in each
Term other than 1997. Frontier Chart 4 clearly displays Justice
Stevens' super-efficient liberal tendencies. In fact, he so dominates
the liberal frontier that only three other Justices, Breyer, Ginsburg
and Souter, have managed to touch the frontier. Justice Ginsburg
just managed to reach the liberal frontier for the first time this Term.
Previously she was alone in reaching neither the liberal nor the
conservative frontiers during her tenure on the Court.
94. See supra Frontier Analysis, Table 2. This superefficiency is due in large part to
Justice Souter's lone vote in favor of the only First Amendment issue decided by the
Court this Term.
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VII. Conclusion
The voting in the 1999 Term generally exhibits a reversal of the
liberal trend of the past few Terms. Supporting this conclusion is the
conservative movement in six of the Study's ten categories, with two
of the remaining four categories showing only trivial liberal
movement. Furthermore, the results in the Swing Vote category
(perhaps the Study's most reliable indicator of the Court's posture)
reveal that, in close cases, the Court is inclined to vote for a
conservative outcome. This result is contrary to the past several
Terms, when swing votes have usually been liberal. The Swing Vote
category, as well as the Criminal/State Party category, also reveals
increasing polarization in the Court. Such polarization, coupled with
this Term's conservative trend, indicates that the Court is becoming
more divided, with the balance of power favoring conservative
outcomes.
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APPENDIX A
1. The Universe of Cases
The only cases included in the database are those 1999 Term
cases decided by full opinion. Decisions on motions have been
excluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases handled by
summary disposition are included only if they are accompanied by a
full opinion of the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent.
Cases decided by a four-four vote resulting in affirmance without
written opinion have been excluded. Both signed and unsigned per
curium opinions are considered full opinions if they set forth reasons
in a more than perfunctory manner. Cases not fitting within any of
these categories are not included in the database for any of the tables.
2. Cases Classified as Civil or Criminal
The classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly
understood definitions. Although habeas corpus is a civil
proceeding,' we classify habeas corpus actions as criminal because
they inevitably involve review of criminal actions. Generally, the
nature of the case is clearly identified in the opinion. Only
occasionally does a case pose a problem of classification. No cases in
1999 raised such a question.
3. Cases Classified by Nature of the Parties-Data Tables I through 4
Cases are included on Data Tables 1 through 4 only if
governmental and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is
necessarily true of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded from these
tables if they do not satisfy this criterion. The governmental entity
might be the United States government or one of its agencies or
officials, or, with respect to a state government, one of its political
subdivisions. A suit against a government official in a personal
capacity is included if government attorneys represent that official, or
if the interests of the government are otherwise clearly implicated. In
instances of multiple parties, a civil case is excluded if governmental
entities appear on both sides of the controversy. If both a state and a
federal entity are parties to the same suit on the same side with only
private parties on the other, the case is included on Data Tables 1 and
2. A case is included more than once on the same table if it raises two
95. James Win. Moore et al., 1-4 Moore's Federal Practice §4.40 (3d ed. 2001).
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or more distinct issues affecting the outcome of the case and the
issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
4. Classification by Nature of the Issue-Data Tables 5 through 9
A case is included in each category of Data Tables 5 through 9
for which it raises a relevant issue that is addressed by written
opinion. One case may thus be included on two or more tables. A
case is also included more than once on the same table if it raises two
or more distinct issues in the category affecting the disposition of the
case and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments. A
case is not included on a table if an issue raised by one of the litigants
is not addressed in any opinion.
Identification of First Amendment and equal protection issues
poses no special problem since the nature of each claim is expressly
identified in the opinion. Issues of freedom of speech, press,
association, and free exercise of religion are included. However,
Establishment Clause cases are excluded since one party's claim of
religious establishment is often made against another party's claim of
free exercise or some other individual right, thus blurring the issue of
individual rights.
Statutory civil rights included on Data Table 7 are limited to
those invoking the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and other civil rights statutes expressly barring discrimination
on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, or
physical handicap. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
included if the substantive right asserted is based on a federal statute,
or if the issue involves the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the case
at hand. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions are excluded if the
substantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution
and the issue relates to that constitutional right. The purpose of this
exclusion is to preserve the distinction between constitutional and
non-constitutional claims.
For Data Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include
not only jurisdiction per se, but also standing, mootness, ripeness,
abstention, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional
questions are excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no
member of the Court dissents on the question, even though the Court
may comment on its jurisdiction.
Federalism cases on Data Table 9 are limited to those cases in
which there were issues raised by conflicting actions of federal and
state or local governments. Common examples of these issues are
preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the Tenth
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28:
and Eleventh Amendments as a limit on federal government action,
and federal court interference with state court activities (other than
review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism or
interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause, are
excluded from the Table.
5. The Swing Vote Cases
Data Table 10 includes all cases where the outcome turns on a
single vote. This category also includes five-four decisions and four-
three decisions, if any, as well as five-three and four-two decisions
that reverse a lower court decision. Affirmances by a vote of five-
three or four-two are not included because a shift of one vote from
the majority to the minority position would still result in affirmance
by a tie vote. A case is included more than once in the Table if it
raises two or more distinct issues affecting the disposition of the case
and the issues are resolved by different voting alignments.
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APPENDIX B
I. Study Methodology
This Study seeks to quantify three characteristics of Supreme
Court voting behavior: voting trends, mean voting percentages, and
relationships among the Justices' voting patterns. We analyze these
characteristics both for the Court as a whole and for individual
Justices." The following sections explain the statistical methods
employed in this Study and how test results should be interpreted.
A. Scores
Each score in this Study is simply the percentage of times a
Justice voted in favor of the party or claim specified by the category.
Some categories contain fewer samples than others, resulting in
coarser score increments.
B. Predictive Modeling
Data in this project were fitted to an Auto Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) forecasting model.' This model is useful
in circumstances where, as in this Study, a single variable (a Justice's
score) is to be forecast based only on its present and prior values with
no other explanatory variables. ARIMA modeling is most easily
explained by starting in the middle of the acronym:
1. Integrated:
This refers to a differencing process, which operates in a manner
similar to differentiation of a continuous function in calculus. The
goal is simply to remove trend from the time series data by
subtracting each score in the time series from the next score in the
series. The resulting differences form a new time series. This
operation may be repeated successively until a trendless or
"stationary" series results. Our model employs only one differencing
operation.
96. Our ability to analyze newer Justices' voting patterns may be restricted or
precluded in some instances due to insufficient data.
97. ARIMA computer modeling was accomplished using MINITAB® statistical
software with p = 1, d = 1, and q = 1. For more information regarding the ARIMA (p, d,
q) model, see Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics 248-49 (1992).
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2. Auto-Regression:
Once the series has been made stationary, an autoregressive
parameter may be determined." This parameter seeks to relate each
data point in the stationary series to the data point immediately
preceding it through multiplication. That is:
X, = AX,.,
where X, is the value of the data series at point t, A is the
autoregressive parameter, and X,.1 is the value of the data series point
immediately preceding X,.
Because we are dealing with a series of data points, however, a
single parameter will almost never precisely produce the relationship
just described for all data point pairs. Some error is inevitable. We
therefore seek to determine that parameter which produces the least
total error when applied to the entire series.'
3. Moving Average:
A second parameter is determined that relates the value of each
series element X, to the error between the estimated value and the
actual value of the previous element X,.' 0 That is:
X, = -Bx,.,
where -B is the Moving Average parameter. The value of this
parameter is also optimized to minimize its total error when applied
to the series.
4. Synthesis:
The previous operations are combined into the equation:
X, = Ax,.,-Bx,,+ E,
where E, represents the residual error remaining between the
calculated and actual values of X,. This final equation is used to
predict the score for the following Term.
98. Many statistical models employ more than one autoregressive parameter due to
various properties of the data series. Our data series produces the most accurate forecasts
with single-parameter (first order) AR and MA models.
99. This is accomplished by applying least squares estimation, i.e., the parameter is
chosen such that the sum of the squared errors is minimized.
100. Although this operation may note seem as intuituve as the autoregression
operation, it may help to think of the error terms as "'shocks' that intially set the process
in motion and ocntinue to keep it in motion thereafter." JOHN C. HOFF, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO BOX-JENKINS FORECASTING 50 (1983).
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C. Mean Testing
We use a "student's t test"10 1 to determine whether this Term's
score (X2), departs in a statistically significant manner from the mean
of all previous Terms' scores (X1). Essentially, we treat these two
numbers as the means of two independent samples drawn from the
universe of all scores in the category.1" We hypothesize that X, is also
the true mean of the population I, and we set up this hypothesis (the
"null" hypothesis) and its corresponding alternative hypothesis as
follows:
Ho: g= X The "null" hypothesis, i.e., X does not significantly
shift gt from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the
two samples are statistically equivalent.
Ha: go X, The alternative hypothesis, i.e., X2 significantly shifts g
from its previous value on the real number line. Therefore, the two
samples are not statistically equivalent.
We then set out to prove the alternative hypothesis, within a
certain confidence interval, 3 by rejecting the null hypothesis."l This
is acqomplished by calculating the following statistic:
s / -4n
The result of this equation (t) is compared to the entry on a t-
distribution table corresponding to the confidence interval desired (o)
and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom (n-k). 5 If the
absolute value of t is greater than the table entry, H is rejected and
we say that the Justice has shown a statistically significant change in
voting behavior this Term.
D. Correlation
Relationships between two Justices' voting records may be
mapped over a two-dimensional Cartesian plane as in Figures 1 and 2.
101. For a practical perspective on this porcedure, see DAVID D. MOORE & GEORGE
P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF STATITSTICS 500-18 (1993). See also
CRAIG & HOGG, supra note 33.
102. This approach introduces potential bias problems due to non-random sampling,
small samples, and dissimilar sample standard deviations. Nevertheless, we use the test to
impose some measure of discipline in analyzing the available data.
103. We have selected a confidence interval of 95%. Because this is a two-tailed test,
X2 may shift p in either a positive or negative direction, - = .025.
104. A full description of the logic behind this seemingly convoluted procedure is
beyond the scope of this article. However, its purpose is to control Type I (or alpha)
error. For a complete explanation, see Moore & McCabe, supra note 99.
105. k = the number of parameters being tested; here, Pu is the only hypothesized
parameter, so k = 1.
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Figure 1 shows a high degree of positive correlation (R=0.7921)
between the voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia
for the Equal Protection category. The points all fall close to an
upward sloping line. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that the
voting percentages of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens show only
a very weak, negative correlation (R2=0.0473). The points are widely
scattered about a downward sloping line. Statistically significant
correlations between and among Justices' Term-to-Term voting
patterns are shown in Regression Tables 1-10. The first number in
each pair is the Pearson correlation coefficient. The second number
is an 2 statistic." Notice that Justices, such as Justice Breyer, for
whom we have few data points, are especially likely to show high
Pearson coefficients, but low 2 statistics. The latter is a more
reliable measure of the actual level of correlation.
Equal Protection 0.717x + 7.4944y =0.1x+744
80 R 
0.7921
Scalia *
40-
20
0 I I I 1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Rehnquist
Equal Protection
y =-0.1542x + 35.473
F= 0.0473
80
1 60Scalla
40 *
20t
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Stevens
The correlation measured in this case is in the Term-to-Term
106. The "adjusted" R 2 value in the tables is a result of the computer's attempts to
filter out any bias in the original R2 result.
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movement of Justices' scores. A high correlation between two
Justices does not mean that they necessarily vote together often. It
simply means that their scores tend to move up and down together
from one Term to another. Also note that correlation in no way
implies causation.
E. Factor Analysis
Factor analysis has long been used by psychologists who attempt
to identify characteristics of personality or intelligence by using
batteries of tests. Their challenge has been to develop tests that
validly measure the characteristics of interest. This Study similarly
attempts to measure the Justices' liberal and conservative leanings by
"testing" their disposition of certain types of cases.
We performed a factor analysis of the Study categories using
Minitab software from Minitab, Inc. The factor loadings presented
were obtained by applying a QMAX rotation to the data. A full
description of the theory and mathematics underlying factor analysis
is beyond the scope of this appendix, but several books on the subject
provide reasonably simple explanations of this complex process."°
F. Frontier Analysis
Frontier analysis can probably best be described with an
example. Suppose four individuals are competing for the title of
"world's greatest athlete." Their scores in two events are listed in the
following table:
Croquet Marbles
Alan 9 2
Betty 7 7
Chuck 4 5
Debbie 3 8
Alan's agent would argue that the title should go to the best
croquet player, while Debbie's agent would argue that the best
marbles player should win. Betty's agent would argue that each sport
should receive equal weight. To see why, weight each of the scores
above by 50% and add each athlete's resulting scores together. Alan
would score (9 x 0.5) + (2 x 0.5) = 5.5. Betty would score (7 x 0.5) + (7
x 0.5) = 7. Chuck's score would be 4.5, and Debbie's score would be
107. See generally Dennis Child, The Essentials of Factor Analysis (2d ed. 1990).
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5.5. The situation is presented graphically in the following figure:
Athletic Frontier
10-
Marbles C
D
0
0 5 10
Croquet
A, B, C, and D represent the athletes. The solid line connecting
A, B, and D represents the athletic frontier, i.e., the boundary beyond
which no athlete has performed regardless of the relative weights
assigned to marbles and croquet. A, B, and D are located at 100% of
the frontier. Moreover, B can be said to be super-efficient to the
extent it lies beyond the line AD connecting the two points adjacent
to it on the frontier. A and D are also super-efficient to the extent
they lie beyond lines (not shown) connecting B with the points at
which the frontier meets each axis. C falls short of the frontier
regardless of the weights assigned to marbles and croquet. However,
an optimal set of weights may be selected such that C "looks his
best," i.e., he comes closest to reaching the frontier.
The same concept can be applied to the Court to determine
which Justice is "most conservative" or "most liberal." However,
instead of two dimensions (croquet and marbles), the Court analysis
includes nine dimensions (all Study categories except Swing Votes).
Although human minds have difficulty envisioning nine dimensions,
computers can handle the required calculations with ease. We
performed our analysis using Microsoft Excel's solver feature.
Although the formulas and procedures involved are straightforward,
a complete description of them is beyond the scope of this
appendix."
108. For more information on frontier analysis, see Donald L. Adolphson & Stephen
Jenkins, Manager's Toolkit: Managerial Decision Modeling and Analysis with Excel
Spreadsheets (1998).
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